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Abstract 
Public program targeting is particularly challenging in developing countries. Transparency in 
eligibility rules for the implementation of social programs could be an effective measure to 
reduce mistargeting. While prior studies have examined the relevance of transparent delivery 
mechanisms, we focus on the transparency of eligibility criteria that can be reformed at relatively 
low cost. India’s social pension reforms in the late 2000s provide the opportunity to examine the 
effect of a change in these criteria. Using two rounds of the India Human Development Survey 
along with extensive administrative information, we test whether increasing the transparency of 
eligibility criteria reduces the mistargeting of social pensions. We thereby allow for an error 
band, and we carefully control for design effects due to a general increase in the number of 
pensions and eligible individuals. Our results confirm the relationship between transparency of 
eligibility criteria and targeting performance and are robust to different specifications of the 
transparency measure and the introduction of a tolerance band.  
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1. Introduction 
In many developing countries, wide-spread corruption, local capture, and clientelism prevent the 
effective delivery of basic social services to the intended beneficiaries. Policy interventions 
raising the level of transparency have been widely shown to improve poor people’s access to 
these services (Björkman & Svensson, 2009; Francken, Minten, & Swinnen, 2009; Olken, 2007; 
Peisakhin, 2012; Peisakhin & Pinto, 2010; Reinikka & Svensson, 2004, 2005, 2011). Owing to 
the lack of reliable income data, the identification of beneficiaries needs to rely on proxy means 
tests. How to design these proxy means tests and which criteria should be included remains a 
subject of ongoing debate. 
India’s old-age social pension reforms in the late 2000s provide us with the opportunity to 
directly test the relationship between transparency improvements and the targeting performance 
for the case of social pensions in India. The reforms that we focus on consist of a clearer 
definition of the eligibility criteria. At the national level, in 2007, the Central Government 
replaced the previously vague poverty-related criterion “destitution” (no further indication was 
given how this should be defined) by the need to belong to a “Below Poverty Line” (BPL)-card 
holding household. This BPL card is also used for numerous other benefits such as food or fuel 
subsidies despite several criticisms of its beneficiary identification and allocation process (Alkire 
& Seth, 2013; Hirway, 2003; Jain, 2004; Panda, 2015; Saxena, 2009; Sundaram, 2003). Whether 
a household is in possession of a BPL card or not is an easily observable criterion and leaves no 
room for interpretation. In addition, there are state pension schemes, with different eligibility 
criteria that also changed around the same period. We can thus explore variation over time and 
across states. 
While our study will have implications for access to anti-poverty schemes in general, studying 
the functioning of old-age social pension schemes is also relevant in itself: In many developing 
and emerging economies the age structure has started to change (United Nations, 2015), 
traditional family structures break down (Rajan & Kumar, 2003), and a large share of the elderly 
population is not yet covered by any contribution-based pension schemes of the formal sector 
(Sastry, 2004). Social pensions, i.e., pensions provided by governments to the elderly poor 
independently of prior contributions to social security systems have thus become increasingly 
relevant (see also Fan, 2010). Nevertheless, the literature on social pensions still remains scarce. 
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In addition, the limited literature that does exist indicates that mistargeting is an extremely wide-
spread phenomenon (Asri, 2016; Kaushal, 2014) – possibly even more than for other public 
programs.  
In this paper, we analyze how the selection of beneficiaries can be improved and focus on the 
role of transparency. One potential approach is to facilitate the selection of beneficiaries by 
making eligibility criteria more transparent and less complex. We focus therefore on the 
verifiability of eligibility criteria and analyze whether more transparent criteria are related to a 
better targeting performance of social pensions. If this expected relationship could be confirmed, 
this would suggest a resource effective means to channel the benefits of social security programs 
to the neediest individuals.  
As the reform of eligibility criteria varied in their specific implementation across states, we can 
test the relationship between the transparency of eligibility criteria and the targeting errors. We 
use two rounds of the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) along with extensive 
administrative information to examine the relationship between the change in eligibility criteria 
and the targeting error over time (before and after the reform). From a political-economy 
perspective, we are interested in assessing how the relevant politicians and administrative officers 
can be driven to respect a set of officially defined eligibility criteria as closely as possible. We 
hence define our criteria of targeting error along the lines of the regulations in official 
government documents. This is despite the fact that these regulations may not coincide with the 
approaches that researchers use to identify the deserving individuals, such as comparing 
consumption expenditures to poverty lines (e.g. Asri, 2016) or using multi-dimensional poverty 
measures (e.g. Alkire & Seth, 2008, 2013). In doing so, we consider that both sides are 
complementary: For targeting to be successful, selection criteria must correctly identify the target 
group, and they must be correctly applied. This paper focuses on the second aspect, which has 
received much less attention in previous studies so far.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the literature, theoretical 
considerations, and the hypothesis derived thereof. Section 3 introduces the Indian case study on 
old-age pensions and the related reform process. Section 4 presents data and methods followed by 
the empirical results in Section 5. Section 6 puts our findings in perspective using a measure of 
poverty that is independent of official targeting criteria. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Literature and theoretical background 
This paper contributes directly to the literature on the role of transparency for the targeting 
performance of anti-poverty schemes. While prior studies examined the relevance of transparent 
delivery mechanisms, we focus on the transparency of eligibility criteria that may be more easily 
amenable to reform. Most closely related to our study, Niehaus et al. (2013, p.206) analyze how a 
proxy means test should be designed if the “implementing agent is corruptible”. Theoretically 
and empirically, the authors show that using more conditions to define eligibility for an anti-
poverty scheme is likely to deteriorate the targeting performance. Intuitively their findings 
indicate that rule breaking becomes more likely if there are more rules that local government 
official needs to follow for the allocation of benefits. The theoretical model and empirical 
application in Niehaus et al. applies also to the context of social pensions in India. In addition to 
the number of conditions that Niehaus et al. are focusing on, we take into account that eligibility 
conditions also differ substantially in their complexity and verifiability and assess the influence 
of transparency improvements for specific reforms of social pension eligibility in the late 2000s. 
In line with Niehaus’ et al. (2013) findings, Drèze and Khera (2010) show the importance of 
using eligibility criteria that are easy to follow and suggest replacing the existing complex 
approach used for the identification of BPL card holders by easily verifiable inclusion and 
exclusion criteria which allow individuals to state their eligibility based on one criterion such as 
“I am eligible because I am landless” or “I am not eligible because I own a car” (p.55). Drèze and 
Khera (2010) argue that this simplification will also help to facilitate participatory monitoring 
and to prevent fraud. 
Increased transparency of eligibility criteria can be achieved by reducing the number and 
complexity of conditions as well as by applying the criteria with high verifiability. Considering 
the verifiability of eligibility criteria is extremely important for the implementation of public anti-
poverty programs in developing countries where data on income are often imprecise and where 
high shares of informal sector employment further complicate the measurement of welfare of 
potential beneficiaries (Baker & Grosh, 1995). 
From a theoretical perspective, we expect that increasing the transparency of eligibility criteria 
affects demand and supply sides of social pension targeting. Transparency improvements 
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influence the behavior of local government officials in charge of selecting beneficiaries (supply 
side) and local citizens applying (demand side): 
On the supply side, through the increase in transparency, the local government officials face 
increased costs of preferential treatment as the likelihood of being detected is higher and 
therefore targeting errors are expected to be reduced. Moreover, using more transparent eligibility 
criteria reduces the administrative burden of selecting beneficiaries and the chance of human 
error. The use of more transparent and simpler eligibility criteria also reduces the administrative 
costs of social protection schemes and thereby allows that at least in theory, these limited 
resources can be used as transfers to the poor. 
On the demand side, increasing the transparency of eligibility criteria facilitates the application 
for the eligible elderly individuals. Fewer and less complex conditions simplify the application 
process and make the outcome of the application more predictable. Given that the applicant 
submits all required documents, the chances of receiving the benefits are higher compared to a 
situation with less transparent criteria and higher discretionary power for the local government 
official. Transparency of eligibility criteria moreover facilitates that people are aware of their 
entitlements and helps individuals to scrutinize the selection of beneficiaries in public meetings 
improving their influence in the beneficiary selection.2 
Based on these theoretical considerations related to the supply and demand side of targeting, we 
hypothesize that increasing the transparency of eligibility criteria reduces targeting errors.   
3. Old-age social pensions in India 
In India, social pension schemes exist at the state and national level, whereby the pensions 
provided by the state governments typically complement the amounts provided under the national 
scheme and/or widen the group of beneficiaries. The national scheme called Indira Gandhi 
National Old Age Pensions Scheme (IGNOAPS) was introduced in 1995 with a central 
government contribution of 75 INR per month. Unlike social pensions in other developing 
countries like Nepal, Bolivia or South Africa that were paid out to all individuals above a certain 
age, social pensions in India are targeted only towards the poor (Palacios & Sluchynsky, 2006). 
                                                          
2 In the Indian context, public meetings are supposed to be used for scrutinizing the list of beneficiaries for several 
anti-poverty schemes including old-age social pensions (see e.g. Besley, Pande, & Rao, 2005). 
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The Ministry of Rural Development is in charge of the social pension scheme but the state 
governments are responsible for the implementation through gram panchayats (village councils) 
and municipalities. The 1998 guidelines of the National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP) 
state that “[the] Panchayats/Municipalities will be responsible for implementing the schemes 
[and] are expected to play an active role in the identification of beneficiaries” (Government of 
India, 1998, p. 4). Panchayats and municipalities represent the smallest local governance unit in 
rural and urban India respectively. 
IGNOAPS initially targeted elderly persons who should be 65 years or older, and destitute 
defined as “having little or no regular means of subsistence from his/her own sources of income 
or through financial support from family members or other sources” (Government of India, 1995, 
p. 7). At the same time, there was a cap on the number of beneficiaries that effectively limited the 
number of the destitute to 50% of the elderly below the Tendulkar poverty line (Rajan, 2001, p. 
613). While this implicitly shifted the eligibility threshold to the median of the distribution of 
monthly per capita household consumption expenditure of the elderly poor (Rajan, 2001, p. 613), 
who did and who did not belong to this group was unobservable in practice, and the vagueness of 
the 'destitution' criterion left ample discretionary power to local officials. In 2007, the previously 
used destitution criterion was replaced by the much more easily observable requirement that 
beneficiaries should live in households that hold a BPL card. In addition, minimum age was 
reduced to 60 years. 
Regarding the complementary state pensions, we also observe several reforms of eligibility 
criteria tending to reduce the complexity of eligibility criteria and increasing their verifiability. 
For instance, in Uttar Pradesh eligibility for the state social pension scheme was originally based 
on land holding in rural areas and individual income in urban areas, while after the reforms it was 
purely based on BPL card holding. Other states such as Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Odisha and 
Karnataka now rely largely on household income to determine the eligibility for their state-run 
old-age pension schemes. In In other states such as Madhya Pradesh, state-run programs simply 
follow the IGNOAPS criteria. Finally, there are a few states such as West Bengal that fully 
abstain from running their own state-level programs. For the latter, the reform of IGNOAPS 
directly defines the overall change in transparency of the relevant eligibility criteria in the state.  
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While there is a general tendency towards the use of more easily verifiable criteria the number of 
criteria increased in many states, which may reduce transparency. In any case, the above 
discussion shows that considerable variety regarding the transparency of eligibility criteria 
remains between states. This is mainly true for state-run schemes, but even the criteria for 
IGNOPAS are not always exactly identical across states. Based on a large number of government 
reports and internet sources, we compiled the exact information for the period before and after 
the reform for seven states. This information is presented in Appendix 1.  
4. Data and methods 
4.1 Generation of the data set 
To test our hypothesis, we examine the likelihood of individual-level mistargeting depending on 
the transparency of the relevant eligibility criteria and on a number of controls. To implement this 
analysis, we combine two data sets with information on (i) individuals, households and 
communities, and (ii) administrative regulations at the state level. Unfortunately, detailed 
information on specific eligibility criteria and their change over time could not be compiled for 
all states, so that the analysis is effectively restricted to the states of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh (see Appendix 1). For the 
individual- and community level data we rely on two waves of the India Human Development 
Survey (IHDS) in 2004-05 and 2011-12 that were conducted by the National Council of Applied 
Economic Research (NCAER) and University of Maryland (Desai et al., 2007, 2015), i.e., before 
and after the relevant reforms.  
The IHDS is a nationally representative individual-level survey including a broad range of 
modules regarding demographics, health, public welfare programs, fertility, agriculture, 
employment, gender relations and women’s status, beliefs, education, social networks, 
institutions, etc. related to individuals, households and communities. The survey covers 41,554 
households in 1503 villages and 971 urban neighborhoods across India. Sampling was based on a 
stratified, multistage procedure in 2004-05 (IHDS-I) and households were re-interviewed in 
2011-12 (IHDS-II) (Desai et al., 2007, 2015). 
As we use individual-level fixed effects regression models to control for individual heterogeneity 
in our econometric analysis, and the data collection includes only two periods, our dataset is 
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effectively reduced to those individuals who were surveyed in both rounds. In addition, given that 
our focus is on old-age pensions, we exclude all individuals that are more than ten years younger 
than the eligibility age.3 Finally, our dependent variable capturing the likelihood of targeting 
error at the individual level can only be identified for individuals in seven states for which 
sufficient information is available on state-level pension schemes, i.e., the seven states listed 
above. As a consequence, for our analysis the sample is reduced to 6,807 elderly individuals 
observed in both rounds of the survey within these seven states, i.e., to a total of 13,614 
observations.  
We combine the IHDS data with state-level administrative data on the specific social pension 
schemes drawn from a large number of government websites and reports.4 As a complement to 
quantitative data, we also collected qualitative information through interviews with policy 
makers, ministerial officials, social activists and scholars specialized on social pensions for 
elderly. The information drawn from these interviews primarily refers to the administrative 
processes and was used for checking the collected administrative information. The interviews 
will not be analyzed directly in this paper, but they provided important background information 
that help in the interpretation of empirical results. We provide a list of conducted interviews in 
Appendix 6. 
4.2 Operationalization 
4.2.1 Dependent variable 
As we intend to measure a possible improvement in targeting, a natural choice for the dependent 
variable seems to be the targeting error. This error can refer both to unjustified exclusion or 
unjustified inclusion. Exclusion error is defined as the share of eligible individuals who are 
excluded, while inclusion error is defined as the share of ineligible individuals who are included 
(see Coady, Grosh, & Hoddinott, 2004). Given that the correct application of the threshold still 
leaves many poor and deserving elderly uncovered, exclusion error tends to be regarded as the 
primary concern in the Indian context. This was revealed in many of our interviews. In addition, 
IHDS data show that the prevalence of inclusion error is much smaller. In fact the number of 
wrongly included individuals, particularly in the 2004-05 survey is so limited that credible 
                                                          
3 This cut-off is based on the age distribution of social pension beneficiaries presented in Appendix 2. 
4 The data source for each variable is presented in Appendix 3. 
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statistical inference appears problematic. We therefore focus on exclusion error here. At the 
individual level, the overall share can obviously not be computed, but we can observe whether a 
person is ‘wrongly excluded’ or ‘wrongly included’. We hence generate dummy variables to 
reflect the targeting error at the individual level. 
As mentioned earlier, in contrast to most of the extant literature (e.g. on social pensions in India 
Asri, 2016), we do not impose any external normative assessment of what is ‘wrong’. Rather, we 
consider the official criteria that public officials are supposed to follow, and try to match them as 
closely as possible with our data. Since the criteria vary across states and over time, a person with 
the same characteristics could be wrongly excluded in one place (or one point of time), and 
rightly excluded in another. Along with the age criterion, we hence need to consider a number of 
variables in this context, related to consumption expenditure, income, BPL, land holding, and/or 
residential status. The destitution criterion relevant primarily for the early implementation of 
IGNOAPS (and some state-level social pension schemes) is measured by per-capita consumption 
(net of social pension receipts) below the median consumption of the elderly poor (Rajan, 2001, 
p. 613), whereby poverty is defined based on the Tendulkar poverty line (separately for rural and 
urban areas), and median consumption of the elderly is approximated by the per-capita 
consumption (net of old-age pensions) of the household in which they live. Since respondents to 
the IHDS do not distinguish between different social pension schemes, when eligibility criteria 
differ between IGNOAPS and the relevant state scheme, we consider that an individual is rightly 
included if she receives the pension and fulfills the criteria for either of these schemes. Along the 
same lines, anyone who fulfills the criteria of either of the schemes but is not included, is 
considered as wrongly excluded. 
Picking up the perspective of relevant politicians and administrative officers also leads to an 
additional consideration: For some of the relevant criteria, they may only be able to observe 
roughly and not exactly whether they are met. It thus appears appropriate to carry out the analysis 
with a tolerance band around the exact thresholds. This may also be useful because respondents 
to the survey (on which we rely to determine age and the degree of poverty) may not always give 
exact answers. For instance, they may provide their approximate, rather than their exact age. And 
finally, targeting error that only comes at the margins of given thresholds appears substantially 
much less relevant than misallocation that leaves some of the poorest and most deserving 
individuals without pension coverage. We thus complement the traditional computation of the 
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error with an additional analysis allowing for a small error margin around the official threshold. 
Since methodologically, it is not possible to create a statistical error band around some arbitrary 
number, we instead construct a 95% confidence band around the cut-offs using the sampling 
distribution of the estimator of the corresponding percentile of the distribution.  
As most of the underlying variables are continuous, the computational procedure is 
straightforward. For the BPL criterion, however, we need to first reconstruct the underlying 
distribution of asset ownership and other socio-economic characteristics of the household. We do 
so by estimating a probit model to obtain the probability of holding a BPL card. The explanatory 
variables of this model are derived from the 13-item census questionnaire used for the 2002 BPL 
assessment (Ministry of Rural Development, 2002). We then compute the 95% confidence 
interval around the mean prediction for those individuals who effectively possess a BPL card. 
The cut-offs for the errors with tolerance band then jointly constitute the limits of the confidence 
interval for BPL card holding itself. For a detailed explanation of the construction of the cut-off 
points including tolerance bands, see Appendix 4. 
4.2.2 Explanatory variables and controls 
Our explanatory variables describe the transparency of eligibility criteria. Based on the 
administrative information described above, we develop three alternative state and time specific 
transparency scores. In general, the transparency score increases if eligibility criteria are fewer in 
number, easier to verify and less complex to implement. Following Niehaus et al. (2013), our first 
indicator (Transparency A) simply counts the different criteria and related conditions taken into 
account to define eligibility. The idea is that the sheer number of these criteria matters, because 
any addition of criteria and related sub-clauses renders the selection process more difficult to 
understand and thereby reduces transparency. However, not all criteria are equally difficult to 
assess, and this may be even more relevant for transparency than the number of criteria itself. 
Building on Drèze and Khera (2010) we hence suggest an additional indicator (Transparency B) 
that considers how easily verifiable the criteria are.5 
Finally, we compute a more sophisticated version of the transparency measure (Transparency C), 
which combines both aspects within a single indicator (see Figure 1). This indicator assigns 
                                                          
5 See Appendix 5 for a more detailed explanation of the construction of Transparency A and B. 
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higher scores to state level regulations that use fewer eligibility criteria, state the relevant criteria 
clearly and choose to use eligibility criteria that are more verifiable.  
Figure 1: Coding of transparency measure C 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
After examining government regulations, we classify eligibility criteria into four categories, 
namely destitution, income, land holding and BPL card holding. In addition, there are criteria 
regarding minimum age (see Annex 1), but we ignore them for our transparency indicators, as 
their existence is uniform across states and over time. Depending on states, eligibility criteria 
include one or several of the above-mentioned categories. We start by evaluating transparency 
within each category. For example, if a state level regulation does not specify anything related to 
land-based eligibility, the score for this category is 3. If it mentions a single clause related to 
land-based eligibility, the score is 2. If there are several clauses and sub-clauses related to land 
based eligibility thereby reducing clarity and increasing complexity, the score is 1. We follow the 
same scoring scheme for each of the four categories: destitution, income, land and BPL.  
We develop the overall transparency index C based on the weighted scores for all categories. We 
thereby compute the weights based on the qualitative data collected during our interviews with 
members of parliament, government officials and other experts, and based on the existing 
Step 2: Applying weights to compute weigted average 
How verifiable are the chosen criteria?   
Destitution  
Score = 1 
Income  
Score = 2 
Land holding 
Score = 3 
BPL card  
Score = 4 
Step 1: Considering individual criteria 
How clearly are the criteria described in the government regulations? 
 Stated with sub-clauses 
Score = 1 
 Clearly  stated 
 Score = 2 
 Criterion not applied  
Score = 3 
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literature on targeting in India that helped us to gauge how verifiable an eligibility criterion is. 
The two steps for coding the transparency measure are visualized in Figure 1.  
We further consider a number of control variables. Given that our dependent variables are based 
on thresholds the construction of which involves a number of possibly relevant controls, the latter 
may be endogenous. We thus distinguish between two sets of control variables – a first set, in 
which we exclude such potentially endogenous factors, and a second set in which we take them 
into account. The first set includes information on household size, widowhood, education and 
employment, access to media, urban or rural locality, and the share of the elderly, the share of 
Muslims, and the share of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Castes in the 
district and political variables. The complementary set of control variables additionally includes 
the working status of the elderly individual, an indicator of household assets, an indicator of 
landlessness, and further variables at district level, i.e., the Gini index, the overall share of 
Tendulkar poor (based on per-capita consumption net of old-age pensions), the share of literate 
adults, and the shares of households that express confidence in local government officials and 
state government. 
4.3 Statistical methods 
Our econometric analysis is based on fixed effects regressions with observations weighted using 
corresponding probability weights. Hausman tests clearly reject the alternative use of random 
effects. Since our dependent variables are binary, the use of a linear specification leads to a linear 
probability model. We use cluster-robust error terms (clustered at the individual level) in order to 
mitigate the resulting heteroscedasticity problems. Given that our time series is very short, the 
alternative use of probit with fixed effects suffers from an incidental parameter problem leading 
to biased coefficient estimates. Fixed effects (conditional) logit is a possible alternative and will 
be used for robustness checks. Our empirical model is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑖 = β0 +  β1Year2012 +  β2TSst + 𝐱′𝛄 + ai +  uit (1)  
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑖 is a binary variable capturing whether individual i is wrongly excluded in period t, Year2012 is a period dummy that takes the value of one in the second round of the survey, TSst is 
the transparency score for state s in period t, ai  is individual fixed effect capturing unobserved 
heterogeneity and x is a set of control variables. Our focus is on parameter β2.  
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An important issue with this regression design may be that  β2 could fully or partially reflect a 
simple design effect. Since a higher number of pensions were allocated in the second period, at a 
given number of eligible individuals, the probability of being wrongly excluded should decline, 
even if pensions were allocated randomly. As the increase of pensions varies across states the 
simple inclusion of the period dummy will not suffice to control for this. Since it is highly 
plausible that the number of pensions made available by each state are correlated with the 
transparency of the eligibility criteria (e.g. because a state that cares for the elderly poor will try 
to improve both, coverage and transparency), our estimator of  β2 may be biased, and the effect 
of transparency itself may be much less pronounced than our initial regression outcomes would 
suggest.6 
At the same time, the number of eligible individuals rises between the two periods, and again this 
increase is not uniform across states. The effect is exactly opposite to the above since this leads to 
a reduction of available pensions relative to eligible individuals, and should hence increase 
exclusion error even if pensions were allocated randomly. Again, part of this problem can be 
solved by controlling for the share of elderly in the population, but issues remain, because the 
number of eligible individuals also increases due to the reform of the eligibility conditions, 
notably through the reduction of minimum age. Again these design features of the pension system 
are plausibly determined together with other changes in the criteria, and hence cannot be 
considered as independent from the transparency variable.  
We solve this issue by comparing our outcomes to the outcomes we obtain when randomly 
allocating pensions and eligibility within each state and period.7 In other words, we use the true 
probability to (a) receive a pension, and (b) to be eligible to determine pseudo-eligible individuals 
and pseudo-pension recipients by drawing from a Bernoulli distribution with the corresponding 
probability (by state and period). From these two random variables, we create a new dummy 
variable mimicking wrong exclusion for this pseudo case. We then re-run regression (1) based on 
the new dependent variable.  
𝑌_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = β�0 +  β�1Year2012 + β�2TSst + 𝐱′𝛄� + a�i +  u�it (2)  
 
                                                          
6 We thank Stefan Klonner for having pointed this out to us. 
7 Note that to be closer to reality, the random draw for 2011-2012 is carried out in a way that pensions and eligibility 
cannot be withdrawn. Hence the random draw is kept from the previous period and augmented by a new random 
draw of additionally eligible individuals and additional pensions only. 
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If the estimate of β�2 is insignificant, we can safely conclude that our initially estimated effect is 
not driven by the mere increase in pensions and/or eligible individuals. If it remains significant, 
we have to consider the difference of the coefficients between the initial regression and the 
pseudo regression (β2 − β�2). This difference corresponds to the effect of transparency cleaned 
for the design effects discussed above. Running a third regression based on the difference 
between (1) and (2) can show whether this difference is significant. 
𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = (β0 − β�0) +  (β1−β�1)Year2012 + (β2− β�2)TSst + 𝐱′(𝛄 − 𝛄�)+ (ai − a�i ) +  (uit −  u�it)  (3)  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
We start by providing a general overview of the development of coverage and mistargeting based 
on descriptive statistics. For presenting the empirical results, we stick to the balanced panel of 
observations also used later for the regression analysis to ensure comparability.  
Figure 2 (a) presents social pension coverage of the elderly, which reveals strong differences 
across states and over time. In particular, in Haryana, coverage has always been much higher than 
in other states. These other states, however, have increased their coverage considerably between 
the two periods of observation. As mentioned above, this change in coverage is an important 
factor to keep in mind as it reduces the exclusion error even if pensions are allocated randomly. 
As the prevalence of poverty varies significantly between states, it appears useful, however, to 
compare the above values with the values if the sample is restricted to the elderly poor. Figure 2 
(b) shows how the picture changes when we only consider the elderly below the Tendulkar 
poverty line: All rates increase, but particularly so in Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Madhya 
Pradesh. 
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Figure 2: Coverage 
(a) Social pension coverage of elderly, by state and year 
 
Notes: Based on observations from balanced panel. The elderly population includes all individuals who are at least as old as the 
local eligible age.  
(b) Social pension coverage of elderly poor, by state and year 
 
Notes: Based on observations from balanced panel. The elderly poor include all individuals who are at least as old as the local 
eligibility age with consumption expenditure net of social pension benefits received below the Tendulkar poverty line. 
Source: IHDS I for 2004-05 and IHDSII for 2011-12. 
We now look at the exclusion error within each state, and how it evolved over time. Figure 3 
shows the exclusion error using the sharp criteria in panel (a), and the tolerance band in panel (b). 
We observe that the exclusion error is extremely high, in 2004-05 in some states even close to 
100%. In all states except Haryana where the pension coverage was highest in both time periods, 
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the exclusion error in 2004-05 was above 75% and still above 60% in 2011-12. The exclusion 
error calculated with the tolerance band is slightly different but shows a similar pattern. In all 
states except Haryana, the exclusion error decreased substantially over time. 
 
Figure 3: Exclusion error 
(a) Based on sharp eligibility criteria 
 
(b) Based on criteria with tolerance band 
Notes: This figure does not include any statistics for Karnataka as applying the tolerance band, slightly fewer 
individuals are counted as eligible and in the case of Karnataka there are 0 “included must” individuals in 2004-05. 
Source: IHDS I for 2004-05 and IHDS II for 2011-12. 
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5.2 Econometric analysis 
Our econometric analysis now allows us to relate these outcomes to differences in the 
transparency of the eligibility criteria. The empirical results are in line with our expectations. The 
fixed-effects regressions consistently show that higher transparency is associated with a lower 
likelihood of being wrongly excluded from social pension benefits (see Table 1 as well as 
Table A5.2 in Appendix 5). In Table 1 below we present the specification using our most 
comprehensive transparency indicator, namely Transparency C. In the first specification, we 
control only for the time dummy. In the second specification, we include all clean control 
variables and in the third specification, we include all control variables (including those that are 
potentially endogenous to social pension receipt). The probability of being wrongly excluded 
decreases by 6-7 percentage points in all models if the transparency score increases by 1 unit  
(≈ ½ standard deviation). The results are robust to the different specification of the transparency 
measure and to the use of the tolerance band (see also Appendix 5). 8 
Table 1: Transparency of eligibility criteria and the likelihood of being wrongly excluded 
(a) Sharp eligibility criteria, transparency measure C 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Wrongly excluded Wrongly excluded Wrongly excluded 
        
Year2012 -0.096*** -0.163*** -0.214*** 
 
(0.016) (0.027) (0.039) 
Transparency C -0.066*** -0.063*** -0.062*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
    Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Household variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
District characteristics No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
Political variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
    Observations 13614 13614 13614 
Number of id 6807 6807 6807 
R-squared 0.076 0.099 0.105 
Notes: Statistical significance is shown by ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 with cluster-robust p-values in parentheses.  
                                                          
8 Results are also robust to the use of a conditional logit specification. In this case, odds ratios for Transparency C are 
0.74, 0.735, and 0.728 for the equations without, with clean, and with all controls respectively. All are statistically 
significant at p<0.001. 
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(b) Using tolerance band, transparency measure C 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Wrongly excluded  
with band 
Wrongly excluded  
with band 
Wrongly excluded  
with band 
        
Year2012 -0.039*** -0.110*** -0.164*** 
 
(0.014) (0.028) (0.035) 
Transparency C -0.054*** -0.050*** -0.052*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
    Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Household variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
District characteristics No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
Political variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
    Observations 13614 13614 13614 
Number of id 6807 6807 6807 
R-squared 0.062 0.089 0.096 
Notes: Statistical significance is shown by ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 with cluster-robust p-values in parentheses. 
 
5.3 Placebo tests 
As discussed in Section 4.3, the robust negative relationship observed between transparency and 
the probability to be wrongly excluded, may simply reflect a design effect due to variation in the 
number of pensions and in the number of eligible individuals that could be correlated with 
transparency. Our alternative dependent variable based on the random draw of both pensions and 
eligible individuals 𝑌𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 should allow us to identify this design effect since the only 
information it includes is the corresponding change in the numbers of eligible persons and 
pensions received. 
Results indicate that indeed, the transparency scores continue to be robustly related to this pseudo 
probability of being wrongly excluded. The coefficient estimates continues to be negative and 
significant. However, the size of the point estimates is only about half of the size of the estimates 
in Table 1. In the differenced regression (following equation 3 above), the difference between the 
original estimates and the placebo estimates is still sizeable and highly significant.  
We present the different coefficient estimates with respect to Transparency C in Table 2 below, 
and with respect to Transparency A and B in Appendix 5, Table A5.3 (all results are only for the 
19 
 
sharp eligibility criteria as the band cannot be created around a random draw of eligible 
individuals). As before, the columns present the different specifications (without controls, with 
clean controls, and with all controls). The rows compare the coefficient estimates for the 
transparency variable in equations 1, 2, and 3. The numbers referring to equation 3 can be 
considered as the net effect of transparency as they are computed by subtracting the design effect 
from the overall effect. According to these results, an increase of Transparency C by 1 unit  
(≈ ½ standard deviation) leads to a net decrease in the probability to be wrongly excluded by 3 
percentage points. In other words, an increase in transparency by one standard deviation reduces 
the probability of any individual to be wrongly excluded by 6 percentage points. This 
corresponds to the effect size we find for the alternative measures A and B in Appendix 5. 
Table 2: Net effect of transparency 
  (1) (2) (3)  
Coefficients  
estimated 
Individual and year fixed 
effects, no controls 
Fixed effects  
and clean controls 
Fixed effects  
and all controls 
Notes 
β2 -0.066*** -0.063*** -0.062*** Estimates from equation 1, 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (copied from Table 1) 
β�2 -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.034*** Estimates from equation 2 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (placebo: design effect) (β2− β�2)  -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** Estimates from equation 3: 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) Net effect of transparency 
Notes: Statistical significance is shown by ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 with cluster-robust p-values in parentheses. 
 
6. Discussion 
Our results have demonstrated that transparent criteria tend to be more systematically applied and 
hence reduce targeting error. However, even a clear and consistently applied criterion is useful 
only if it correctly identifies the intended beneficiaries. As explained above, the BPL criterion has 
been widely criticized in this respect. If better-off households rather than the poor possess BPL 
cards, then the above described changes in eligibility criteria and the related improvements in 
targeting will not necessarily lead to greater access of the elderly poor to the social pension 
benefits. It may, in fact, primarily increase the access of the well-to-do. Dutta (2010) as well as 
Asri (2016) suggest that this may indeed be the case.  
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We briefly study this question by examining the consumption quintiles of the ‘wrongly excluded’ 
cases in the elderly population. Figure 4 shows the distribution of those considered as ‘wrongly 
excluded’ according to the official criteria before and after the reform. The graphical illustration 
confirms the misfit of the official criteria. About 60% of those considered as ‘wrongly excluded’ 
in the period after the reforms belong to the two highest consumption quintiles (29% to the 
highest and 32% to the second highest quintile). While they may be ‘wrongly excluded’ from an 
official perspective (as they fulfill the official criteria such as holding a BPL card), this exclusion 
appears clearly justified from a distributional perspective. On a positive note, the share of those 
wrongly excluded with very low consumption expenditures in the lowest quintile has gone down 
from 28% to 2% indicating a better inclusion of poor elderly among the beneficiaries after the 
reforms compared to before. 
 
Figure 4: Consumption quintiles of wrongly excluded 
 
Source: IHDS- I for 2004-05 and IHDS- II for 2011-12. 
Clearly, the reformed eligibility criteria do not solve the problematic mismatch between official 
eligibility and actual poverty. While local government officials do a better job in allocation social 
pensions in line with official rules since the criteria have become more transparent, BPL card 
holding as one frequently used criterion suffers from significant targeting error itself. This 
remains a challenge that needs to be addressed in future reforms.  
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Q1 (poorest) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (richest)
2011-12 2.22% 11.22% 25.76% 32.16% 28.61%
2004-05 27.62% 26.35% 26.03% 11.60% 8.40%
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It should be noted that the Indian government is well-aware of the problems related to BPL 
(Government of India 2009, p. 17ff.). In 2011, the Socio-Economic and Caste Census (SECC) 
was launched with the primary objective to revise the identification of BPL households. It uses a 
variety of asset- and income-based criteria along with direct exclusion and inclusion conditions. 
The new criteria were formally adopted by the Ministry of Rural Development in January 2017 
(Press Information Bureau / Government of India, 2017). It remains to be seen to what extent 
they will improve upon the status quo. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Public program targeting represents a strong challenge, notably in the context of many 
developing countries where corruption, clientelism and elite capture are high. In such contexts, 
social and political connectedness appears to be highly correlated to the benefits received. These 
problems must be expected to be even greater for programs like social pensions targeted to the 
elderly poor, who are generally less well-educated, less mobile and less vocal when it comes to 
claiming their rights. India’s reform of its old-age social pension schemes in the late 2000s 
provides the opportunity to examine the effect of the introduction of a large scale transparency 
improvement in this context. Given the variation in the reforms between states and over time, we 
are able to assess whether (and to what extent) increasing the transparency of eligibility criteria 
helps to reduce the mistargeting of old-age social pensions. Our panel fixed effects regressions 
show that the likelihood of being wrongly excluded decreases with more transparent eligibility 
criteria, and our results are robust to different specifications and the inclusion of a tolerance band.  
A placebo regression reveals, however, that the mere increase in pension numbers along with the 
increased number of eligible individuals biases the initial estimates. To obtain the net effect of 
transparency, the influence of these changes in numbers (design effect) needs to be purged out of 
our estimates. Final (net) results indicate that the increase in any of our alternative transparency 
indicators by 1 standard deviation leads to a reduction of the probability for wrong exclusion by 
about 6 percentage points. This represents a sizeable effect. Our results thus suggest a means to 
improve targeting that is more easily implemented and more resource efficient than other reforms 
that attempt to address the officials’ behavior directly, e.g. by increased monitoring and tighter 
vigilance.  
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However, increasing the compliance with targeting criteria is beneficial only to the extent that the 
criteria correctly identify the elderly poor. In our context, BPL status as a frequently used 
indicator to identify beneficiaries shows only a modest correlation with old-age poverty. In order 
to achieve the intended distributional effects, this mismatch needs to be addressed. In India, 
reforms are currently under way regarding the redefinition of BPL, but their effect remains yet to 
be seen. 
All in all, our results suggest that increasing the transparency of eligibility criteria can play an 
important role in reducing the under-coverage of social pension benefits. Yet, reforms should not 
stop at this point. First substantial targeting error remains once the more transparent criteria have 
been introduced. Second, the criteria need to be well-defined in order to properly match the 
intended target group. Otherwise, there may be no formal targeting error, but nevertheless, the 
neediest individuals in the population are not reached. As currently debated among academicians 
and development practitioners, clear-cut exclusion criteria that manage to prevent clearly non-
poor individuals from access to anti-poverty benefits seem to be the best option for targeting of 
social pensions in India.  
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Appendix 1: Eligibility criteria in the seven states included in the analysis 
State Name of scheme  Eligibility criteria 2004-05 Eligibility criteria 2011-12 Source of information 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
IGNOAPS  Age 65 years or above, destitute Age 60 years or above, BPL card holding Government of Himachal 
Pradesh (undated 
(a),(b),(c)),    State Old Age 
Pension Scheme  
Age 60 years or above, individual annual 
income ≤ Rs. 6000 and if the elderly has 
adult children their income should not 
exceed Rs. 11000 
Age 60 years or above, individual does not have 
anyone to take care of him/her, individual 
annual income ≤ Rs. 9000 or total annual family 
income ≤ Rs. 15000 excluding his/her own 
income 
Haryana IGNOAPS Age 60 years or above, personal income 
from all sources together with spouse’s 
income ≤  Rs. 50.000 per annum, domicile 
requirement 
Age 60 years or above, BPL card holding 
 
  
Government of Haryana 
(2006, 2011, 
undated(a),(b)) 
  Old Age Samman 
Allowance 
Scheme (since 
November 2005) 
Scheme did not exist. Age 60 years or above, personal income from 
all sources together with spouse’s income ≤  Rs. 
200,000 per annum for rural and urban areas 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
IGNOAPS Age 65 years or above, destitute, domicile 
requirement 
 
Age 60 years or above, BPL card holding for 
rural areas, BPL or Antyodaya card holding for  
urban areas, resident of UP  
Government of Uttar 
Pradesh (2010a,b,c, 
undated), Comptroller & 
Auditor General of India 
(2009) 
 KISAN 
PENSION 
SCHEME (valid 
up to May 2007) 
Age 60-64 years, land holding ≤ 3.25 acre 
for rural areas or individual income < Rs. 
12000 per annum for urban areas, domicile 
requirement 
Scheme did not exist. 
  MAHAMAYA 
(valid during 
2007-12)  
Scheme did not exist. Age 60 years or above, BPL card holding for 
rural areas, BPL or Antyodaya card holding for  
urban areas, domicile requirement 
West Bengal IGNOAPS Age 65 years or above, destitute Age 60 years or above, BPL card holding Government of West 
Bengal (undated) 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
IGNOAPS Age 65 years or above, destitute Age 60 years or above, BPL card holding Government of Madhya 
Pradesh (undated (a),(b), 
(c))    Samagra Social 
Security  Pension 
Scheme 
Age 60 or above, destitute  Age 60 years or above, BPL card or landless 
and destitute 
Odisha IGNOAPS Age 65 years or above, destitute Age 60 years or above, BPL card holding Government of Odisha 
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  Madhu Babu 
Pension Yojana 
(since 2008) 
Scheme did not exist. Age 65 years or above, destitute  
or 
Age 60 years or above and annual household 
income from all sources ≤ Rs. 24000, domicile 
requirement 
(undated (a), (b), 2008) 
Karnataka IGNOAPS Age 65 years or above, BPL card holding, 
annual income < Rs. 6000 per annum 
Age 60 years or above, BPL card holding Government of Karnataka 
(undated, ), Rajasekhar et 
al (2009), 
webindia123.com (2007),  
Chathukulam et al (2012) 
  Sandhya Suraksha 
Yojana (since 
2007)                  
Scheme did not exist. Age 60 years or above, annual 
household income ≤ Rs 20000 
Notes: All listed conditions separated with commas are “and”-conditions. If they are “or”-conditions, we have specifically mentioned this. 
References for state-level eligibility criteria 
Government of Himachal Pradesh (undated(a)) Social Security Pension Schemes. Shimla: Directorate of Social Justice and Empowerment. Available at 
<http://admis.hp.nic.in/himachal/welfare/SocialSecurityPensionSchemesOct2013_A1b.pdf>, for application format, <http://admis.hp.nic.in/himachal/welfare/wel-
pension%20forms.pdf>, accessed on 12 July 2016.  
Government of Himachal Pradesh (undated(b)) Senior Citizen Schemes. Shimla: Directorate of Social Justice and Empowerment. Available at 
<http://admis.hp.nic.in/himachal/welfare/SeniorCitizenSchemesOct2013_A1b.pdf>, accessed on 12 July 2016.  
Government of Himachal Pradesh (undated(c)) Evaluation Study of Beneficiaries under Old Age Widow and National Security Pension Scheme. Shimla: Evaluation 
Division, Planning Department. Available at < 
http://hpplanning.nic.in/beneficiaries%20under%20old%20age%20widow%20and%20national%20security%20pension%20scheme%20-
%20himachal%20pradesh.pdf>, accessed on 12 July 2016.  
 
Government of Haryana, (2006) Notification [regarding the Old Age Allowance Scheme] No. 1988-SW4(2006) dated 20 September 2006, extracted from Haryana 
Government Gazette, dated 7th November 2006, Social Welfare Department. Available at <http://socialjusticehry.gov.in/Website/oasa(1).pdf>, accessed on 12 July 
2016.  
Government of Haryana, (2011) Notification [regarding the Old Age Samman Allowance Scheme] No. 458-SW(4)2011 dated 10 June 2011, extracted from Haryana 
Government Gazette, dated 10 June 2011, Chandigarh: Social Justice & Empowerment Department. Available at 
<http://socialjusticehry.gov.in/SocialJusticeNotification.pdf>, accessed on 12 July 2016.  
Government of Haryana, (undated(a)) Social security scheme. Chandigarh: Directorate of Social Justice & Empowerment. Available at 
<http://socialjusticehry.gov.in/Website/SocialSecurity_PensionSchemes.pdf>, accessed on 12 July 2016.  
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Appendix 2: Age distribution of social pension beneficiaries 
(a) 2004-05 (b) 2011-12 
  
Source: Authors’ illustration, descriptive statistics based on IHDS-I for 2004-05 and IHDS-II for 2011-12. 
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Appendix 3: Variable description and sources 
 2004-05 2011-12      
VARIABLES mean se mean se Measurement 
level 
Definition Data source 
Error excluded 0.367 0.011 0.296 0.008 Individual Dummy equal to 1 if individual does not receive social pension but 
fulfills the locally relevant eligibility criteria 
IHDS & administrative 
information 
Error excluded band 0.221 0.01 0.205 0.007 Individual Dummy equal to 1 if individual does not receive social pension but 
fulfills the locally relevant eligibility criteria using tolerance band 
IHDS & administrative 
information 
Transparency A 2.804 1.180 2.247 0.897 State Transparency score A= 5 – number of eligibility criteria (clauses and 
sub-clauses). Range is 1-4. For a detailed explanation, see Appendix 5. 
Administrative 
information 
Transparency B 1.267 0.442 2.370 1.212 State Transparency score B = verifiability score of the least verifiable 
category of eligibility criteria applied. Range is 1-4. For a detailed 
explanation, see Appendix 5. 
Administrative 
information 
Transparency C 24.623 1.903 23.534 1.909 State Transparency score C = Weighted sum of eligibility criteria whereby 
weights are based on verifiability score. Range is 20-26. 
Administrative 
information 
Year2012 0 0 1 0 Year Dummy for the second survey period (2011-2012) IHDS 
Pension recipient 0.047 0.003 0.202 0.007 Individual Dummy equal to 1 if individual receives social pension IHDS 
Age 62.49 0.167 69.34 0.168 Individual Age of the individual IHDS 
Female 0.492 0.01 0.494 0.01 Individual Dummy equal to 1 if individual is female IHDS 
Literate 0.379 0.01 0.381 0.009 Individual Dummy equal to 1 if individual can read and write a sentence IHDS 
Widowed 0.245 0.009 0.363 0.009 Individual Dummy equal to 1 if individual is widowed IHDS 
Working 0.611 0.01 0.328 0.01 Individual Dummy equal to 1 if individual is working at least 240 hours per year IHDS 
BPL card     Household Dummy equal to 1 if household holds a BPL card IHDS 
Household assets 10.708 0.103 12.93 0.116 Household Number of household assets owned IHDS 
Landless 0.359 0.01 0.384 0.009 Household Dummy equal to 1 household is landless IHDS 
Household maximum 
education 
7.78 0.107 7.991 0.111 Household Education level of the most educated person in the household IHDS 
Permanent job 0.105 0.006 0.339 0.01 Household Dummy equal to 1 if any household member has a permanent job IHDS 
Newspaper 0.186 0.007 0.512 0.01 Household Dummy equal to 1 if household members read newspaper IHDS 
TV 0.368 0.009 0.718 0.01 Household Dummy equal to 1 if household members watch TV IHDS 
Household size 6.5 0.072 5.511 0.058 Household Number of persons sharing one kitchen IHDS 
Urban 0.189 0.006 0.235 0.006 Household Dummy equal to 1 if household lives in urban area IHDS 
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Local government 
confidence 
0.302 0.005 0.284 0.006 Village/block Share of households having confidence in the local government IHDS 
State confidence 0.233 0.003 0.349 0.003 District Share of households having confidence in the state government IHDS 
Share of elderly in 
population 
0.086 0.001 0.11 0.001 District Percentage of elderly population of total population IHDS 
Share of SC, ST, 
OBC in population 
0.72 0.004 0.725 0.003 District Percentage of SC, ST, OBC population of total population  IHDS 
Share of Muslims in 
population 
0.134 0.002 0.138 0.003 District Percentage of Muslims of total population IHDS 
Share of literate 
adults in population 
0.569 0.002 0.63 0.002 District Percentage of literate adults among adult population IHDS 
Gini coefficient 0.347 0.001 0.337 0.001 District Gini coefficient based on consumption expenditures adjusted for 
social pension benefits 
IHDS 
Head count ratio 0.344 0.003 0.164 0.002 District Head count ratio estimated based on consumption expenditures 
adjusted for social pension benefits 
IHDS 
Local government 
connection 
0.105 0.006 0.339 0.01 Household Dummy equal to 1 if household has a direct connection to the local 
government 
IHDS 
Political 
competition 
(Herfindahl) 
0.668 0.002 0.673 0.001 District Political competition in the Lok Sabha constituency based on the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index 
Statistical reports of 
2004 and 2009 Lok 
Sabha Elections from 
Election Commission of 
India 
Participation in 
public meeting 
0.297 0.004 0.252 0.004 Village/block Share of households participating in public meetings IHDS 
Number of 
observations 
6807 
 
6807 
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Appendix 4: Defining tolerance bands for eligibility criteria 
Though the eligibility cut-offs for age, income, and land possession are clearly defined and 
unambiguous in official documents of the seven analyzed states, their implementation in reality is 
problematic because many of the rural elderly may not provide documentary proof of their 
eligibility. This leaves some type of subjective “margin of error” in deciding who should be 
(in)eligible for pensions. For example, if someone is 59 years old (cut-off 60 years) and applies 
for old-age pension without any documentary proof of her age, there is a chance of her being 
included. In comparison with someone who is much younger than the cut-off age, this case is 
clearly not a gross violation of eligibility criteria. One way of distinguishing these two cases is to 
construct a band around eligibility cut-offs. It is obvious that we cannot find any statistical error 
band around some arbitrary number. However, we may find the standard error of an estimator of 
the corresponding distributional parameter. To incorporate this “margin of error” we construct a 
95% confidence band around the cutoffs using the sampling distribution of the estimator of the 
corresponding percentile of the distribution. The steps to find the band are given below.  
Age: We find the percentage of the population who are below 60 years (or 65 years depending on 
year and state). Let this be x percent. Therefore, our age cut-off is xth percentile of the age 
distribution. We now find standard error and 95% confidence band of the estimate of xth 
percentile. We do this separately for each state in two periods. If someone is above the upper 
limit of this band, she is considered as ‘clearly eligible’ (i.e., must be included) in terms of age. If 
someone is below the lower limit, he is considered as ‘clearly ineligible’ (i.e., must be excluded).  
We follow the same method to find bands around income and land-holding criteria.  
Destitute: The destitution criterion is not as objective as age or BPL criteria. However, we know 
that around 50% of the poor households are considered under different benefit schemes for the 
destitute. Therefore, we interpret the bottom-half of the poor as destitute. First, we convert 
nominal monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) to real using block specific 
poverty line deflators (Tendulkar poverty line). The consumption expenditure considered here is 
net of social pension receipts. Then we find the median of the real MPCE of the poor 
(Tendulkar). Finally, the standard error and 95% confidence band around the median are found 
separately for each state in two periods. 
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BPL: Below Poverty Line (BPL) cards are distributed based on a census carried out by the 
Government of India in 2002. This census assessed several socio-economic conditions of the 
poor households including asset holding, housing, clothing, sanitation, education, occupation, 
employment, and indebtedness and migration status. We first estimate a Probit model of BPL 
card holding status based on the above socio economic conditions using IHDS survey data for 
2012. This model is estimated separately for each state. We then find the cut-off for the positive 
outcome based on the mean of the propensity scores of the BPL card holders in each state 
separately. The standard error of the estimated mean is used to construct the 95% confidence 
band around the cut-off. 
Since this is only an approximation, it may happen that an actual BPL card holder does not fall 
into this interval. To ensure that the band is not more restrictive than the original indicator, we 
consider both criteria jointly to define who is clearly eligible or ineligible: A person is considered 
as ‘clearly eligible’ (must be included) if he does hold a BPL card and has an asset-based 
propensity of holding a BPL card greater than the upper limit of the confidence band. At the same 
time, a person is considered as ‘clearly ineligible’ (must be excluded) if she does not hold a BPL 
card and has an asset-based propensity of holding a BPL card smaller than the lower limit of the 
confidence band. 
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Appendix 5: Alternative transparency measures 
This appendix first provides further details on the construction of transparency measures A and 
B, and then presents the results based on a replication of Tables 1 and 2 using these alternative 
transparency scores.  
As explained in the text, Transparency A is based solely on the number of conditions through 
which eligibility is defined in each state and period. Age criteria are not taken into account as 
they are required everywhere and at all times. For the remainder, we have already defined four 
categories of frequently used criteria, namely destitution, income, land holding and BPL card. 
Within these, there can be different sub-clauses, namely different regulations for rural and urban 
areas, or for male and female individuals. In addition, some states use further criteria outside the 
four general categories, e.g. domicile requirements. When summing up the different clauses and 
sub-clauses, we get to a maximum of four per state and year. To let the final transparency score 
start from 1 (lowest level of transparency) and to increase with lower levels of complexity, it is 
computed as: 
(Transparency A)jt= 5 – (number of conditions)jt, ∀ state j and period t. (A5.1) 
 
For example in Uttar Pradesh 2011-12 we have two types of conditions for BPL (see 
Appendix 1), hence a count of 2 for the BPL category. There are no other conditions in any other 
categories. So the overall count is 2, and Transparency A is 5 – 3 = 3. 
Transparency B does not consider the number of conditions, but only their verifiability. The 
verifiability scores for each category of conditions are the same as used for the weights used for 
the construction of Transparency C and explained in Section 4. These scores are: destitution=1 
(most vague, most difficult to assess), income=2, land holding=3, and BPL card holding=4 
(easiest to assess). When computing the score, we consider that if one condition is vague, 
eligibility as a whole becomes vaguely defined and hence transparency is low. Transparency B is 
thus defined by the criterion used that obtains the lowest score in terms of verifiability: 
(Transparency B)jt= min(verifiability score of criteria applied)jt, ∀ state j and period t. (A5.2) 
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For example in Karnataka 2004-05 income and BPL are used as criteria (see Appendix 1). 
Income has a verifiability score of 2, while BPL has a verifiability score of 4. Income is the least 
verifiable among the two. Hence the value of Transparency B is 2. 
Table A5.1 below compares the two complementary measures, both with each other and with the 
combined measure Transparency C explained in Section 4. 
Table A5.1: Transparency scores by state and year 
 Transparency A Transparency B Transparency C 
 2004-2005 2011-2012 2004-2005 2011-2012 2004-2005 2011-2012 
Himachal Pradesh 2 1 1 2 20 22 
Haryana 3 3 2 2 24 22 
Uttar Pradesh 1 2 1 4 24 26 
West Bengal 4 4 1 4 26 24 
Madhya Pradesh 4 2 1 1 26 22 
Odisha 4 1 1 1 26 21 
Karnataka 3 3 2 2 26 26 
 
The correlation between the different indices is low for Transparency A and B (𝜌𝐴,𝐵 = 0.06) 
since they are based on different conceptual ideas. At the same time each of them is highly 
correlated with Transparency C since they contribute to the computation of the latter (𝜌𝐴,𝐶 =0.57, 𝜌𝐵,𝐶 = 0.41). Noticeably, the effect of the reforms in the late 2000s seems to be reflected in 
improved transparency only when looking at Transparency B. While they led to an improvement 
in the verifiability of the criteria (stronger focus on BPL), the number of clauses and sub-clauses 
was often not reduced and even increased in several states.  
Table A5.2 presents the regression results using Transparency A and B rather than 
Transparency C (cf. Table 1), each time with and without the use of the tolerance band. The 
effect of the transparency measure remains negative and significant throughout, i.e. no matter 
which dimension of transparency we consider. 
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Table A5.2: Results using alternative transparency measures 
(a) Sharp eligibility criteria, transparency measure A 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Wrongly excluded Wrongly excluded Wrongly excluded 
        
Year2012 -0.086*** -0.044* -0.055* 
 
(0.000) (0.064) (0.090) 
Transparency A -0.109*** -0.112*** -0.111*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Household variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
District characteristics No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
Political variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
    Observations 13614 13614 13614 
Number of id 6807 6807 6807 
R-squared 0.058 0.069 0.073 
(b) Using tolerance band, transparency measure A 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Wrongly excluded  
with band 
Wrongly excluded  
with band 
Wrongly excluded  
with band 
        
Year2012 -0.030** -0.000 -0.022 
 
(0.028) (0.989) (0.413) 
Transparency A -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.090*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Household variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
District characteristics No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
Political variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
    Observations 13614 13614 13614 
Number of id 6807 6807 6807 
R-squared 0.043 0.054 0.061 
Notes: Statistical significance is shown by ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 with cluster-robust p-values in parentheses. 
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(c) Sharp eligibility criteria, transparency measure B 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Wrongly excluded Wrongly excluded Wrongly excluded 
  
   Year2012 0.156*** 0.187*** 0.142*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transparency B -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.133*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Household variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
District characteristics No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
Political variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
    Observations 13614 13614 13614 
Number of id 6807 6807 6807 
R-squared 0.079 0.089 0.095 
(d) Using tolerance band, transparency measure B 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Wrongly excluded  
with band 
Wrongly excluded  
with band 
Wrongly excluded  
with band 
  
   Year2012 0.174*** 0.195*** 0.146*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transparency B -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.120*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Household variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
District characteristics No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
Political variables No Yes, clean controls Yes, all controls 
    Observations 13614 13614 13614 
Number of id 6807 6807 6807 
R-squared 0.071 0.082 0.092 
Notes: Statistical significance is shown by ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 with cluster-robust p-values in parentheses. 
 
Table A5.3 shows the results for the placebo regression and the net effects when subtracting the 
design effect determined by the latter. Just as for Transparency C, the resulting net effects 
correspond to about half of the originally measured effects (Table A5.2). For both measures A 
and B, a 1-unit increase in transparency (≈ 1 standard deviation) corresponds to a net decrease of 
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the probability to be wrongly excluded by 5-6 percentage points. The two complementary 
dimensions of transparency hence contribute to the reduction of mistargeting to a similar extent. 
 
Table A5.3: Net effects using alternative transparency measures 
(a) Transparency measure A 
  (1) (2) (3)  
Coefficients  
estimated 
Individual and year fixed 
effects, no controls 
Fixed effects  
and clean controls 
Fixed effects  
and all controls 
Notes 
β2 -0.109*** -0.112*** -0.111*** Estimates from equation 1, 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (copied from Table A5.2a) 
β�2 -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.052*** Estimates from equation 2 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (placebo: design effect) (β2− β�2)  -0.049*** -0.058*** -0.059*** Estimates from equation 3: 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Net effect of transparency 
(b) Transparency measure B 
  (1) (2) (3)  
Coefficients  
estimated 
Individual and year fixed 
effects, no controls 
Fixed effects  
and clean controls 
Fixed effects  
and all controls 
Notes 
β2 -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.133*** Estimates from equation 1, 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (copied from Table A5.2c) 
β�2 -0.069*** -0.066*** -0.070*** Estimates from equation 2 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (placebo: design effect) (β2− β�2)  -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.063*** Estimates from equation 3: 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Net effect of transparency 
Notes: Statistical significance is shown by ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 with cluster-robust p-values in parentheses. 
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Appendix 6: List of interviews conducted in Delhi, March - April 2016 
Name Designation Date 
Mr Ladu Kishore Swain  Member of Parliament, Aska, Odisha 
(Party: Biju Janata Dal) 
16 March 2016 
Mr Konda Vishweshwar 
Reddy  
Member of Parliament, Chelvella, 
Telangana (Party: Telangana Rashtra 
Samiti) 
21 March 2016 
Mr Udit Raj Member of Parliament, North West Delhi, 
Delhi (Party: Bharatiya Janata Party) 
21 March 2016 
Mr Jagdambika Pal Member of Parliament, Domariyaganj, 
Uttar Pradesh (Party: Bharatiya Janata 
Party) 
22 March 2016 
Mr Nikhil Dey Social Activist, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti 
Sangathan, Rajasthan 
28 March 2016 
Prof Arvind Panagariya Vice-Chairman, National Institute for 
Transforming India (former Planning 
Commission), New Delhi 
28 March 2016 
Dr Ashok K. Jain Adviser, Rural Development, National 
Institute for Transforming India (former 
Planning Commission), New Delhi 
28 March 2016 
Dr Rinku Murgai Economist, World Bank, New Delhi 12 April 2016 
  
 
 
 
 
